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Soviet policy toward Japan during
World War II
La politique soviétique envers le Japon pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale
Tsuyoshi Hasegawa
1 The Soviet Union fought the war against Japan in Manchuria, Korea, Sakhalin, and the
Kurils from August 9 through September 5, 1945.1 It is important to incorporate the Far
Eastern theater into the general description of the Soviet role in World War II for three
reasons. First, during the war Stalin always considered the Far East one of the important
factors in his comprehensive strategy in the war. Second, the war that the Soviet Union
fought in Asia also contributes to the discussion on whether Stalin and Soviet policy
during World War II were motivated by the realist approach or by ideology. Third, the
end of the Pacific War marked the beginning of the nuclear age, and therefore, how Stalin
reacted to the American use of  the atomic bomb had important implications for the
subsequent development of the relationship between nuclear weapons and the Cold War.2
2 This paper attempts to examine the objectives of Soviet policy in the war against Japan. I
argue that the primary goals of the Soviet Union from the Yalta Conference to the entry
into the war were to enter the war so that it could obtain the war trophies promised at
Yalta, and further that once the Soviet Union managed to enter the war, the Soviets were
determined to physically occupy these territories. By skillfully combining diplomacy and
military operations, Stalin managed to achieve his goals. This is not to say that Stalin
pursued his policy without any mistakes. In fact, he misjudged the U.S. fears of the Soviet
role in the Pacific War, and he was completely outwitted by Truman about the Potsdam
Proclamation. Nevertheless, he was aided by Japan’s reliance on Soviet neutrality. In the
end,  the Soviet  entry into the war played a  more crucial  role  in Japan’s  decision to
surrender than the U.S. atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.3 Stalin achieved his
goals in the war against Japan, but in the long run, the Soviet entry into the war and the
occupation of the Kurils instilled profound enmity among the Japanese against the Soviet
Union, making it exceedingly difficult for the Soviet Union to achieve rapprochement
with Japan.
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Soviet policies in Europe and the Far East
3 It is well to remember that the Soviet Union faced threats from two directions prior to
the outbreak of World War II, from Nazi Germany and from Japan.4 To counter the threat
from Japan, the Soviet Union employed diplomacy and military operations. In reaction to
the Manchurian Incident, the Soviet government initially adopted an appeasement policy,
unsuccessfully offering to conclude a non-aggression pact with the Japanese, and selling
the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER)  to  Japan in 1935.  After  the outbreak of  the Sino-
Japanese War in 1937, the Soviets concluded a non-aggression pact with China and began
to provide military aid in order to sink Japan deeper in the quagmire of their war with
China. Militarily, the USSR created the Far Eastern Military District, double-tracked the
Siberian Railroad, established the Pacific Fleet, increased the number of troops deployed
in the Far East, and engaged in successful military operations against the Japanese troops
in the Lake Khasan incident of 1938, and the Nomonhan war of 1939.5
4 After the outbreak of  World War II  in Europe,  the Soviet  government concluded the
Neutrality Pact with Japan in April 1941, to avoid a two-front war. When the Germans
attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, Stalin ordered the Far Eastern front not to take any
actions that might provoke Japan’s attack, while maintaining sizable forces in the Far
East. It was only when Stalin was reassured by intelligence sources that Japan was not
likely to attack the Soviet Union, that he moved the best divisions in the Far East to
bolster the defense of Moscow.6
5 Once the first imminent threat for survival of the Soviet Union receded in December,
1941, Stalin revealed his intention to join the war against Japan in his conversations with
British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, although he rejected Eden’s request to join the
war immediately. The Soviet Union was bound by the Neutrality Pact, Stalin explained,
and as long as the nation had to devote all its energy to fight the Germans, it could not
wage war on two fronts.7
6 After the victory of  the battle  of  Stalingrad,  however,  Stalin began seriously making
preparations for the war against Japan. He ordered the NKVD to construct a new railway
line to connect Komsomolsk-na-Amure to Sovetskaia Gavan´ on the Pacific Coast. At the
Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow and at the Teheran Conference in October 1943,
he pledged to enter the war against Japan after the capitulation of Germany, a promise
that was made to extract Allied agreement to open a second front in Europe. He intended
to wage war against Japan for geopolitical interests, regardless of the Allied position, but
he managed to sell this demand as if it was his concession to the Allies. At the conference,
he made it clear that he would make known in due course his “desiderata” for Soviet
entry into the Pacific War.8
7 Meanwhile,  Stalin requested from his foreign policy experts their position papers on
Soviet policy toward Japan. Both the Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Ivan Maiskii,
in  January  and  the  Ambassador  to  Tokyo,  Iakov  Malik,  in  June,  1944,  in  separate
memoranda advocated obtaining Soviet borders that would assure the future security of
the Soviet Union, specifically insisting on regaining southern Sakhalin and the Kurils.9
Both justified these demands in terms of Soviet security, not on the basis of historical
legitimacy  or  any  ideological  principle.  But  Maiskii  and  Malik  assumed  that  these
demands should be met by the Allies in a peace conference after the war without the
Soviet  Union  participating  in  the  war.  Stalin  disagreed.  Skeptical  about  the  Allies’
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goodwill to honor their commitment to the Soviet demands, Stalin was determined to
occupy  these  territories  by  military  means.  War  against  Japan  was  a  necessary
prerequisite to fulfill his goal.
8 In the summer of 1944,  Stalin told Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevskii,  Commander of the
Belorussian front, about his intention to appoint him commander of the Far Eastern front
to oversee Soviet preparations for the war against Japan. In September, in strict secrecy,
Stalin ordered the General Staff to draw up estimates for the concentration and logistical
support of troops in the Far East in the war against Japan. The General Staff completed
the estimates at the beginning of October.10
9 In December, Stalin for the first time revealed his “desiderata” to Harriman. He brought
out a map and said that southern Sakhalin and the Kurils should be returned to the Soviet
Union.  Stalin  then  drew a  line  around the  southern  part  of  the  Liaotung  Peninsula
including Dairen and Port Arthur, and said that the Soviet Union wished to secure the
lease for these ports again. In addition, he also wished to obtain the lease for the CER and
the Southern Manchurian Railway, and demanded recognition of the status quo in Outer
Mongolia.11 He was determined to acquire everything on this list at the Yalta Conference.
 
Yalta Conference, February 1945
10 By concluding the Yalta  secret  agreement  with Roosevelt  and Churchill  at  the  Yalta
Conference Stalin managed to gain the concessions he had revealed to Harriman in return
for his pledge to enter the war against Japan three months after the German capitulation.
12 With regard to subsequent Soviet policy toward Japan, the following factors should be
mentioned.
11 First, the Yalta secret agreement was a masterpiece of Stalin’s diplomatic maneuvering.
The article that dealt with the Kurils was separated from the article that stipulated the
restoration of  Russia’s  former rights  “violated by the treacherous attack of  Japan in
1904.” By insisting that this independent article on the Kurils was as important as the
others and carefully using the expression, “handed over,” rather than “restored,” Stalin
precluded the possibility that the Kurils would be taken away later as a violation of the
Atlantic Charter and the Cairo Declaration. Moreover, having Roosevelt and Churchill
pledge that these claims “shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated,”
he made doubly sure that these promises would not be ignored.13
12 Second, in order for Stalin to gain these war trophies, he had to fulfill two important
conditions: participation in the war and agreement with the Chinese government on the
Yalta  terms.  Otherwise,  the  Allies  might  renege  on  their  promises  at  the  peace
conference. Thus, it was imperative for him not only to enter the war, but to prevent the
war from ending before the Soviets joined it. Third, Stalin’s diplomatic success was based
on the continuation of his previous tactical maneuvers. Relying on America’s need to
secure Soviet participation in the war against Japan, he presented his real objectives as if
they were concessions to the United States.
 
Abrogation of the Neutrality Pact
13 On April 5, Molotov informed the Japanese Ambassador to Moscow Sato Naotake that the
Soviet government had no intention to renew the Neutrality Pact.  To Sato’s question
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about whether the Soviet government was annulling the pact forthwith or whether it
took the position that the pact was still in force until the end of its original five-year term
in  April  1946,  Molotov  stated  that  the  pact  would  remain  in  force  until  it  expired.
Reconfirming the validity of the Neutrality Pact, while in secret preparing the war against
Japan, left unresolved the problem of how to justify the violation of the pact once the
Soviets went to war against Japan.14
14 Why did the Soviet Union renounce the Neutrality Pact? The first explanation is that
unless the Soviet government notified the Japanese, the pact would have been renewed
automatically for another five years.15 Obviously, Stalin did not wish his countrymen to
compare an eventual Soviet violation of the Neutrality Pact with the German violation of
the Non-Aggression (Molotov-Ribbentrop) Pact.
15 The more compelling reason was that this was intended as a message to the United States
that the Soviet Union was preparing to honor its commitment to enter the war against
Japan after Germany’s capitulation at the time when the relationship with the US was
becoming increasingly contentious. He had reasonable expectations that the renunciation
of the Pact would not provoke Japan’s attack, since he received intelligence reports from
Japan  that  reassured  him  that  Japan  would  continue  to  seek  Soviet  neutrality.16
Nevertheless,  before  the  Soviet  government  renounced  the  Pact,  Stalin  ordered  the
military leaders in the Far East  to place Soviet  troops on alert  for possible Japanese
attacks,  to strengthen the protection of the railways,  and to reinforce the defense of
major cities including Vladivostok and Khabarovsk.17
 
May-June 1945: Stalin-Hopkins and Hirota-Malik
meetings
16 The growing tension between the United States and the Soviet Union over Poland and the
unannounced suspension of  Lend Lease prompted Truman to send his  special  envoy,
Harry Hopkins, to Moscow to iron out differences. The Far Eastern question was also an
important issue at this meeting. To Hopkins’ question of when the Soviet Union would
enter the war, Stalin replied that the Soviet Army would be “in sufficient preparedness”
by August  8.  Stalin promised,  not  that  the Soviets  would enter the war precisely on
August 8, but that preparations would be completed by that date. Later, Stalin remarked
that the opening of operations would depend on the weather, since the autumn fog could
make the campaign difficult.18
17 Stalin raised the possibility of discussing “the zone of operations for the armies and zones
of occupation of Japan.” Hopkins cabled to Truman: “The Marshal expected that Russia
will share in the actual occupation of Japan and wants an agreement with the British and
us as to occupation zones.”19 Hopkins’  acceptance of this proposal may have whetted
Stalin’s appetite and this may have led to his demand during the Soviet Hokkaido-Kuril
operations for both a Soviet occupation zone on the northern half of Hokkaido and a
Soviet  occupation sector  in Tokyo.20 The most  important  point  at  the Stalin-Hopkins
conference was Hopkin’s offer to include concrete proposals for Japan’s surrender on the
agenda of the forthcoming Big-Three conference in Potsdam.21 This would give Stalin a
justification to enter the war against Japan in violation of the Neutrality Pact.
18 As the emperor and the policymakers in Japan became aware of the impending defeat of
the Battle of Okinawa, they decided to seek rapprochement with the Soviet Union to exit
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from the war. To achieve this goal, the Japanese government entrusted former prime
minister and foreign minister Hirota Koki to contact Ambassador Malik on June 7 in an
unofficial capacity. During a series of meetings with Malik in June Hirota sounded out the
possibility of concluding an alliance or a non-aggression pact, or at least the renewal of
the Neutrality Pact. Japan’s ill-advised move fell right into the Soviet trap to prolong the
war.  Molotov  instructed  Malik  to  neither  agree  on  specific  conditions  nor  cut  off
negotiations. As it turned out, the terms Japan offered to renew the Neutrality Pact were
less  generous than the written promise that  Stalin had obtained from Roosevelt  and
Churchill at Yalta. And Malik, as instructed, set a snail’s pace for negotiations by sending
the Japanese proposals through the diplomatic pouch.22
 
The Politburo decides to go to war
19 Stalin summoned a combined meeting of top leaders of the Politburo, the government,
and the military on June 26 and 27. This meeting decided to launch an all-out offensive
against Japanese forces in Manchuria in August. The General Staff’s recommendation that
three  fronts  simultaneously  move  toward  the  center  of  Manchuria  met  with  final
approval.23 War against Japan was no longer a secret confined to Stalin and a small circle
of his advisers: it became the official policy of the Soviet government.
20 At this conference the geographical parameters of the military operation were discussed.
The major objective of  the Soviet military operation was to secure all  the territories
promised by the Yalta Agreement, including Manchuria, southern Sakhalin, and the Kuril
Islands. The occupation of northern Korea was considered essential to cut off the escape
route of the Japanese forces. Opinions were divided, however, on the advisability of the
Hokkaido operation. Without the occupation of Hokkaido, the Soviets could not secure
control of the Soya Strait and the Kurils. Marshal K.A. Meretskov thus proposed that they
occupy  the  island.  This  measure  was  supported  by  Nikita  Khrushchev,  but  Nikolai
Voznesenskii, Molotov, and Marshal Georgii Zhukov opposed the operation as too risky,
even likely to provoke counteraction from American forces. Stalin asked Zhukov how
many additional  divisions would be needed to carry out this  operation.  The marshal
answered at least four. Stalin said nothing further. The question of Hokkaido remained
undecided.24
21 The following day on June 28 Stalin issued three directives, the first to the commander-
in-chief of the Far Eastern Front to complete all the preparations for the attack by August
1; the second to the commanders of the troops of the Maritime groups to complete the
preparations for attack by July 25; and the third to the commander of the Transbaikal
front to complete preparations by July 25.25 These orders did not set the precise date of
attack, which would most likely be decided later in consultation with the commanders in
the Far East.26 The gigantic war machine in the Far East had been set in motion.
 
Pre-Potsdam: Japanese-Soviet and Sino-Soviet
negotiations
22 Only after the USSR had made the final  decision to wage war against  Japan,  did the
Japanese  government  abandon  its  futile  attempt  through  Hirota  to  conclude  an
agreement with the Soviets, and requested Soviet mediation to terminate the war. On July
Soviet policy toward Japan during World War II
Cahiers du monde russe, 52/2-3 | 2011
5
12,  Foreign  Minister  Togo  sent  a  telegram  to  Ambassador  Sato,  instructing  the
ambassador to see Molotov immediately to present the emperor’s message requesting
Moscow’s mediation to terminate the war. Togo stated that it was the emperor’s wish to
end  the  war,  but  made  it  clear  that  so  long  as  the  Allies  demanded  unconditional
surrender, Japan had no choice but to fight to the last man.27 Molotov, however, refused
to meet Sato before his departure for Potsdam.
23 Molotov instructed his deputy, Solomon Lozovskii, not to reject this request outright, but
to encourage Sato to clarify the ambiguities in Togo’s telegram with regard to whom it
was addressed. Clearly, the Soviets intended to keep Japan waiting to buy more time.
Stalin was, however, keenly aware that Japan’s surrender was imminent. Consumed by
the fear that the war might end before the Soviet Union could join it, even before the
Potsdam Conference began, Stalin called Vasilevskii, and asked him if it would be possible
to  move  up  the  date  of  attack  by ten  days  from the  August  11  set  by  the  Stavka.
Vasilevskii  answered that “the concentration of  the troops and the transportation of
essential war supplies would not permit such a revision” of the attack schedule. Stalin, for
the time being, accepted Vasilevskii’s cautious judgment.28
24 Before entering the war,  Stalin had to secure Chiang Kai-shek’s consent to the Yalta
provisions. The provisions of the Yalta secret agreement grossly violated the sovereign
rights of the Chinese government.  Although Chiang Kai-shek was informed about the
Yalta secret agreement a few weeks after the conference, he was not formally told of its
specific provisions regarding Chinese territory until  June 15.29 Stalin and the Chinese
Foreign Minister T.V.  Soong began negotiations on July 2.  Soong was adamant about
China’s rights with respect to Outer Mongolia and railways and ports in Manchuria. While
China insisted that it could not make concessions on these issues involving sovereignty,
to Stalin these represented the indispensable acquisitions on which future Soviet security
would depend. The unsuccessful negotiations were broken off when Stalin and Molotov




25 Stalin came to Potsdam, assuming that the United States still needed the Soviet entry into
the war. He also counted on Hopkins’s assurance that the United States would place the
question of a joint ultimatum to Japan on the agenda. Also, Stalin hoped that the United
States would exert pressure on the Chinese to accept the Yalta provisions. Thus, Stalin
expected Truman, who, he assumed, was as eager as Roosevelt to invite the Soviets to join
the war, to help resolve these two obstacles.
26 Before the Potsdam Conference, Truman had faced two irreconcilable dilemmas. The first
was how to deal with the Soviets. Truman and his new secretary of State, James Byrnes,
began to worry about the implications of the Soviet entry into the war against Japan,
which would inevitably expand Soviet influence in Asia.  If  he could avoid it,  Truman
would prefer to end the war before the Soviets entered it.  Nevertheless,  his military
advisers argued that even if Soviet participation in the war was no longer necessary to
win the war, it would still hasten Japan’s surrender, thereby saving American lives.
Soviet policy toward Japan during World War II
Cahiers du monde russe, 52/2-3 | 2011
6
27 Truman  faced  another  dilemma  over  unconditional  surrender.  Not  only  was
unconditional surrender  Roosevelt’s  legacy,  but  this  demand  was  supported  by  the
overwhelming majority of the American people.  Truman felt that it  was necessary to
avenge the humiliation suffered by Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor by bringing Japan to its
knees  by  imposing  unconditional  surrender.  But  many  influential  advisers  such  as
Secretary  of  War  Henry  Stimson,  Under  Secretary  of  State  Joseph  Grew,  and  Navy
Secretary James Forrestal came to advocate revision of the surrender conditions in such a
way as to allow the Japanese to maintain the monarchical  system under the present
dynasty.  This  concession,  they  argued,  would  strengthen  moderate  elements  that
surrounded the emperor and induce them to seek early surrender.
28 The situation suddenly changed on July 16 when the United States succeeded in exploding
the first atomic bomb in Alamogordo in New Mexico. With this powerful new weapon, the
US could imagine forcing the Japanese surrender without relying on Soviet participation
in  the  war.  It  made  it  possible  for  Truman  to  stick  to  the  unconditional  surrender
demand.  With the detonation of  the atomic bomb in New Mexico,  the major goal  of
Truman and Byrnes now shifted to securing Japan’s surrender before the Soviets could
enter the war.31
 
Stalin-Truman meetings: July 17 and July 18
29 At the first Stalin-Truman meeting on July 17 prior to the opening of the conference,
Stalin told Truman that the Soviet Union was ready to enter the war “by the middle of
August,” but he said that prior to the Soviet entry into the war he would need to reach an
agreement with the Chinese. Although the Soviet record of this meeting makes us believe
that it was Truman who solicited the Soviet entry into the war and requested information
about the Sino-Soviet negotiations, the American record makes it clear that it was Stalin,
who without Truman’s prodding volunteered to express his intention to enter the war,
and brought up the issue of the Sino-Soviet negotiations.32
30 Differences between the two versions of this meeting speak volumes about the different
expectations each leader had of the other. Stalin felt that Truman should feel gratitude
for his commitment to enter the war “by the middle of August.” For this pledge to enter
the war, Stalin expected Truman to reward him by putting pressure on the Chinese to
come to an agreement with the USSR. But Truman was ambiguous about the Soviet entry
into the war. In his Potsdam diary, Truman wrote: “He’ll be in the Jap War on August 15th.
Fini  Japs  when  that  comes  about.”  This  passage,  often  taken  by  historians  as  the
convincing  evidence  that  Truman  welcomed  the  Soviet  entry  into  the  war  must  be
balanced by the passage that preceded it: “I asked if he had the agenda for the meeting.
He said he had and that he had some more questions to present. I told him to fire away.
He did and it is dynamite — but I have some dynamite too which I’m not exploding now.”
33 Truman and Byrnes were working out a “timetable” to force Japan’s surrender. They
wished to avoid Soviet entry into the war, and they were determined to use the atomic
bomb for that purpose. With Stalin’s reference to the date of Soviet entry into the war
either “by the middle of August” or “in the middle of August,” Truman believed that the
Soviets would enter the war on August 15.34
31 Stalin wanted the U.S. pressure on China to come to an agreement by volunteering the
information that  the Soviets  were ready to  enter  the war.  But  he was  disappointed,
because although Byrnes committed himself to the Yalta secret agreement, he warned
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that the United States would not support any provisions that went beyond the Yalta
provisions. Furthermore, Truman and Byrnes insisted on the free port status of Dairen.35
Clearly, the Americans were not playing the game as Stalin had hoped.
32 On  July  18,  when  Truman  paid  a  return  visit  to  Stalin’s  villa,  Stalin  revealed  the
information that  the  Japanese  had asked Moscow to  mediate  in  ending the  war.  He
revealed to Truman Ambassador Sato’s note requesting Soviet mediation to terminate the
war. According to the American record, “Stalin pointed out that the Soviet Union was not
at war with Japan and that it might be desirable to lull the Japanese to sleep, and possibly
a general and unspecific answer might be returned, pointing out that the exact character
of the proposed Konye [sic] mission was not clear.” Truman agreed.36 Stalin was eager to
prolong the war until all the preparations for his attack were completed, while Truman
was also interested in prolonging the war only until the atomic bomb could be dropped to
shock the Japanese into surrender.
 
Truman tells Stalin half-truth about the atomic bomb
33 General Leslie Groves’ detailed report of the atomic bomb test in Alamogordo reached
Truman on July 21. This was the “dynamite” Truman had eagerly been waiting for. With
the atomic bomb, he was confident that the United States could unilaterally force Japan
to surrender without the Soviet Union. It became important, therefore, to exclude Stalin
from the joint ultimatum to Japan. The atomic bomb also made it possible, he believed, to
dictate unconditional surrender to Japan.37
34 During a recess of the Potsdam Conference on July 24, Truman approached Stalin and
casually  revealed  that  the  United  States  now  possessed  “a  new  weapon  of  unusual
destructive force.” Stalin showed no interest, at least so it seemed to the president.38 But
Stalin was not fooled. Through the Soviet spies planted in the Manhattan Project, Stalin
was aware that the United States was about to explode the first atomic bomb. Truman’s
half-truth must have provoked Stalin’s suspicion.39
35 Something  must  have  changed  in  Stalin’s  thinking  after  Truman’s  less-than-truthful
revelation about the atomic bomb. After receiving Ambassador Sato’s clarifications about
the  Konoe  mission  on  July  25,  Deputy  Foreign  Commissar  Lozovskii  sent  his
recommendations as to how to respond to Japan’s latest peace overtures. He suggested
that the Soviet government continue to use stalling tactics by requesting the specific
proposals  that  Konoe  would  bring  to  Moscow.  Molotov  flatly  rejected  this
recommendation, writing in the margin of Lozovskii’s dispatch “Not necessary [Ne to].”




36 Truman’s half-truth about the atomic bomb piqued Stalin’s suspicion, but an even greater
shock was waiting for  him.  Contrary to Stalin’s  expectations,  Truman was no longer
interested in bringing Stalin into the joint ultimatum.  Truman and Byrnes had been
engaged in revising the draft proclamation they had received from Stimson on July 2, and
in this revision they had been consulting with the British in strict secrecy behind the
backs of the Soviet delegation.41 They deleted the passage that Stimson had recommended
in his  original  draft  that  would have allowed the possibility  of  Japan’s  retaining the
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monarchical system under the present dynasty. Truman and Byrnes also crossed out all
references to the Soviet participation in the war that had been included in Stimson’s
original draft.
37 At 7 p.m. Potsdam time on July 26, the Potsdam Proclamation was given to the press to be
released. At 4 p.m. Washington time American West-Coast shortwave radio stations began
transmitting  the  text  to  Japan.  After  the  press  release,  Byrnes  sent  a  copy  of  the
ultimatum  to  Molotov  as  a  “diplomatic  courtesy”.  Caught  by  surprise,  Molotov
immediately asked Byrnes to postpone the announcement for two or three days,  but
Byrnes told Molotov that it was too late, since the proclamation had already been handed
to the press.42
38 We  now  know  that  the  Soviets  had  prepared  their  own  version  of  the  Potsdam
Proclamation. The Soviet draft began: “The time has come when the Governments of the
Allied democratic countries — the United States,  China,  Great Britain,  and the Soviet
Union — have recognized that it is essential to make a joint declaration about our
relations with Japan.” It then listed Japan’s transgressions, from its attack on China to its
“treacherous” attack on Pearl Harbor, “the same perfidious surprise attack by which it
had attacked Russia forty years ago.” The draft stated: “People all over the world have a
burning desire to terminate the continuing war. The United States, China, Great Britain,
and the Soviet Union consider it their duty to take joint, decisive measures immediately
to bring the war to an end.” Finally, the document called on Japan to “lay down arms and
surrender without any conditions.”43
39 The document reveals the Soviet approach to the joint ultimatum. It is striking in its
conciliatory tone towards the Allies, indicating how desperately Stalin wished to issue a
joint declaration against Japan with the United States and Britain. But was Stalin not
concerned that the issuance of such a joint declaration might immediately lead to Japan’s
surrender, thereby circumventing his ultimate objective of actually waging war against
Japan to earn the trophies promised at Yalta? To avoid this undesirable outcome, the
Soviet draft included a call for “unconditional surrender.” The Soviet government was
fully aware that the inclusion of this demand would lead Japan to continue the war, thus
guaranteeing the prolongation of the war until the Soviet attack. Stalin and Molotov must
have hoped that the issuance of the ultimatum might be postponed to coincide with the
Soviet offensive. This expectation was by no means far-fetched, given that the Operation
Division of the U.S. War Department had originally envisaged the optimal timing of the
ultimatum as the moment of Soviet entry into the war.44
40 When Byrnes met Molotov on July 27, the Secretary explained that he had not received
Molotov’s request for postponement of the ultimatum until that morning. This was a flat
lie, since Molotov through his interpreter had made this request as soon as he received
the text on the evening of July 26. On July 29, Stalin proposed that the United States and
Britain  extend  their  formal  request  to  Stalin  to  append  his  signature  to  the  joint
ultimatum.  This  request  placed Truman and Byrnes  in  an awkward position.  Byrnes
wrote: “We had, of course, begun to hope that a Japanese surrender might be imminent
and we did not want to urge the Russians to enter the war.” But they could not ignore
Stalin’s request. In the end, the United States made a tortuous argument that the Soviet
Union  could  declare  war  against  Japan  on  the  basis  of  Paragraph  5  of  the  Moscow
Declaration of October 30, 1943, as well as the United Nations Charter Articles 103 and
106.45 Obviously, this was a flimsy legal basis, since the Moscow Declaration was signed
only by three states, and the United Nations Charter had not been ratified. Japan had
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nothing to do with these documents. The main point of all this was that the United States
rejected Stalin’s request to extend a formal invitation to the Soviet Union to join the war
against Japan.46 Byrnes wrote:
I  must frankly admit that in view of what we knew of Soviet actions in eastern
Germany  and  the  violations  of  the  Yalta  agreements  in  Poland,  Rumania  and
Bulgaria, I would have been satisfied had the Russians determined not to enter the
war.  Notwithstanding  Japan’s  persistent  refusal  to  surrender  unconditionally,  I
believed the atomic bomb would be successful  and would force the Japanese to
accept surrender on our terms.47
41 The  “timetable”  that  Truman  and  Byrnes  had  worked  out  became  clear.  Truman’s
intention was to gain Japan’s surrender with the atomic bomb before the Soviet entry,
and Stalin’s objective was to enter the war before Japan’s surrender. It was, indeed, a
“race to the finish.”
42 Stalin was fooled. He did not succeed in appending his signature to the joint ultimatum.
But this failure reaped an unexpected benefit.  The Japanese government noticed two
things in the Potsdam ultimatum. First, Stalin did not sign the ultimatum, and second, the
ultimatum contained the unconditional surrender demand without clarifying the position
of the emperor. Prime Minister Suzuki Kantaro declared that he would “mokusatu” –
ignore – the ultimatum. Japan would continue to seek Moscow’s mediation to terminate
the war.48
 
Stalin’s reaction to the Potsdam proclamation
43 The fiasco of the Potsdam Proclamation convinced Stalin that Truman had decided to
force Japan’s surrender unilaterally before the Soviet entry into the war. His reaction was
immediate. On July 30, he appointed Vasilevskii as supreme commander of the Soviet
troops in the Far East as of August 1.49 On August 2, Stavka ordered the formation of three
fronts: the First Far Eastern Front under Marshal Kirill Meretskov, the Second Far Eastern
Front under General Maksim Purkaev, and the Transbaikal Front under Marshal Rodion
Malinovskii. The cloak of secrecy had been cast off.50
44 The Potsdam Conference was over on August 2, and the Soviet delegation left Berlin that
day and returned to Moscow on August 5. On August 3, Chief of Staff Colonel-General S.P.
Ivanov and “Colonel  General  Vasiliev:  (Vasilevskii’s  nom de  guerre)  sent  an important
report on the situation of the front to Stalin and Antonov.
45 Vasilevskii  first  stated that  the troops of  the Transbaikal  Front were completing the
advance to the designated area of concentration about fifty to sixty kilometers from the
border so that by the morning of August 5, they would be ready, “in accordance with your
instructions.” The report estimated that from the moment of receiving the order to cross
the  border  to  the  actual  beginning  of  action,  “a  minimum of  five  full  days  will  be
required.” It then suggested that “the optimal time for the initiation of action” that was
to say “crossing the border,” would be “August 9-10.” After the initial border crossing by
the elite troops of the Transbaikal Front, the First and the Second Far Eastern Fronts
should initiate action “on the same day and at the same time.” In other words, contrary
to the previous operationa plan, Vasilevskii proposed the attack in two waves, first by the
border crossing by the elite troops of the Transbaikal Front, and then the simultaneous
attacks by the First and the Second Far Eastern Fronts. Further it requested “no later than
August 5” the final instructions about the date of the beginning of the attack for the First
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and the Second Far Eastern Fronts as well as “about other related questions, especially of
a “political and diplomatic nature.”51
46 This report suggests that the change of the date of attack from the previously agreed
August 11 to August 9-10 was more than likely a response to a Stalin request to move up
the date. Since this report was dispatched on August 3, Stalin’s request must have been
sent earlier than that date. It is most likely, although it cannot be determined from any
available sources, that the order was issued from Potsdam on July 30, at the same time
when Vasilevskii was officially appointed the commander of the Soviet Army in the Far
East, after Truman rejected Stalin’s last attempt to obtain the Western Allies’ invitation to
join the Potsdam ultimatum. Vasilevskii’s request for instructions regarding questions of
a “political and diplomatic nature” strongly suggests that the change of date was dictated
by political motivations arising from the Potsdam ultimatum.
47 After receiving Vasilevskii’s recommendation to advance the date of attack by one to two
days, however, the Stavka seems to have turned down this request, presumably judging
that to do so would be too risky. An element of surprise was a crucial component of the
entire strategy, and all troops across the long border had to attack on the same day and at
the same time. As previously agreed, the precise time of attack was set at midnight Chita
time on August 11 (6 p.m. Moscow time on August 10).52
 
The Americans drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima
48 Stalin returned to Moscow on the evening of August 5. His appointment log for August 5
shows that immediately after his arrival at the Kremlin, he frantically resumed activities,
meeting his top advisers.53 Then the shocking news reached Moscow. The Americans had
dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima at 8:15 Hiroshima time (0:15 Moscow time)
on August 6.
49 The news seems to have crushed Stalin. Pravda did not report anything about the atomic
bomb on Hiroshima on August 7, and only on August 8 did it report Truman’s statement
on  the  atomic  bomb  in  a  lower  column  on  page  4  without  comment.54 Stalin’s
appointment log for his Kremlin office shows that he did not see anyone on August 6 in
the Kremlin, although we do not know about possible meetings at his dacha. It is possible
to assume that Stalin was devastated by the news, believing that the game was over, that
Japan would surrender, and that the Americans had won.55 On the afternoon of August 7,
Molotov was at the airport to meet the Chinese delegation headed by T.V. Soong. He was
in  a  dejected  mood,  and told  Soong that  Japan was  on the  verge  of  collapse.56 This
represented the mood of the Soviet leadership after the Hiroshima bomb.
Soviets declare war on Japan
50 Contrary to Truman’s expectations, however, the atomic bombing on Hiroshima did not
immediately lead to Japan’s decision to surrender. On August 7, one day after the atomic
bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, Foreign Minister Togo sent another urgent telegram to
seek an immediate appointment with Molotov to obtain Moscow’s answer regarding the
Konoe mission.57 This meant that despite the Hiroshima bomb, Japan continued to rely on
Moscow’s mediation.
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51 Sato’s request to meet Molotov came sometime in the afternoon. Stalin immediately leapt
to action. At 4:30 p.m. he ordered Vasilevskii to begin the Manchurian operation the next
day at midnight on August 9, Chita time (6 p.m. August 8 Moscow time), thus moving up
the date of  attack by forty-eight hours.  Accordingly,  Vasilevskii  instantly issued four
directives between 10:35 and 11:10 Chita time (4:35 to 5:10 Moscow time), each ordering
all forces on the three fronts and the Pacific Fleet to begin operations at 6 p.m. Moscow
time on August 8.58 T.V. Soong was surprised to learn that Stalin wanted to start the
negotiations right away without giving the Chinese delegation any time to rest. At the
late night meeting, however, the differences did not narrow. Stalin then decided to enter
the war without any agreement with the Chinese.59
52 In the meantime, Sato received the news that Molotov would expect to see him at 5 p.m.
on August 8 at the Foreign Commissariat. When the ambassador arrived at the designated
time, Molotov interrupted Sato’s greetings, and proceeded to read the Soviet declaration
of war. The declaration explained that the Allies had asked the Soviet Government to
enter the war against Japan, and to join the Potsdam ultimatum. It further stated that
since Japan had rejected this ultimatum, the Soviet Government considered itself, “as of
August 9, in a state of war with Japan.”60 Within one hour, the Soviet tanks and airplanes
had  crossed  the  border  and  attacked  the  Japanese  positions  in  Manchuria.  Stalin
succeeded in joining the war in the nick of time.
53 A few minutes after 3 p.m. Washington time, Truman held a news conference at the White
House. He read a terse statement to the reporters, announcing that the Soviet Union had
declared  war  against  Japan.61 Things  had  not  gone  according  to  his  timetable.  After
Truman’s  short  announcement,  Byrnes  released  a  statement  to  the  press.  Ostensibly
welcoming Soviet  entry into the war,  he stated that at  the Potsdam Conference,  the
president had conveyed to Stalin that Soviet participation in the war would be justified
on the basis of Paragraph 5 of the Moscow Declaration and Articles 103 and 106 of the
United Nations Charter.62 Byrnes’ statement was an indirect and underhanded way to




54 The whole purpose of  the Soviet Far Eastern Campaign was to physically occupy the
territories promised at Yalta. The Soviets, with 1.5 million men, converged on Manchuria
from three directions with astonishing speed. The Soviet attack shocked the Japanese
policymakers, who had pinned their last hope to end the war on Soviet mediation. The
Supreme  War  Council,  which  had  not  been  called  even  after  the  atomic  bomb  was
dropped  on  Hiroshima,  was  immediately  summoned  after  the  Soviet  invasion.
Nevertheless,  the  Japanese  government  still  remained  divided  between  those  who
advocated immediate surrender with only one condition,  i.e.,  the preservation of the
emperor system [kokutai] and those who insisted on other conditions. The second atomic
bomb was dropped on Nagasaki when the Supreme War Council was in the middle of
heated discussion, but the second atomic bomb had no influence on the outcome of the
discussion.  Finally,  it  took  the  emperor’s  unprecedented  intervention  on  behalf  of
accepting the terms specified in the Potsdam Proclamation, with the sole condition that
the imperial prerogatives would not be touched.63
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55 The US government rejected Japan’s conditional surrender, and presented the Byrnes
Note to Japan, which stipulated that the emperor and the Japanese government would be
subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces and that the ultimate form of the
government would be determined by the Japanese people. To Truman’s surprise, Moscow
promptly  accepted  the  Byrnes  Note.  Stalin  was  pleased  with  US  rejection  of  Japan’s
conditional surrender offer,  since it  gave the Soviet troops more time to expand the
territory under Soviet occupation.64
56 Stalin also gambled on the Chinese response. He expected the Soviet advance deep into
Manchuria  would  induce  the  Chinese  to  make  concessions  for  fear  that  the  Soviet
influence  in  Manchuria  would  lead  to  the  establishment  of  a  communist  regime  in
Manchuria. He won the gamble. The Chinese finally came around to an agreement on
August  15,  three  hours  after  Japan  announced  its  unconditional  acceptance  of  the
Potsdam terms.65
57 Thus, the Soviet entry into the war was decisive for Japan’s decision to surrender, with
greater influence than the two atomic bombs combined. The Soviet entry into the war
dashed any hope of terminating the war through Moscow’s mediation. In addition, the
Soviet  Army’s  quick  advance  into  Manchuria  instilled  fear  among  Japan’s  highest
policymakers  that  to  prolong the war  would enhance the possibilities  of  the Soviets
insinuating themselves into occupation policy, endangering the dynasty.66
 
Soviet military operations and Stalin-Truman
diplomatic maneuvers
58 The Japanese government accepted the Potsdam terms unconditionally on August 14, and
the emperor read the imperial rescript of the termination of the war on the radio on
August 15.  After the emperor’s acceptance of surrender, the Soviets stepped up their
military operations. Vasilevskii ordered Soviet forces to “continue offensive operations
against Japanese forces,” since the Soviets could not accept the emperor’s statement on
August 14 as the military capitulation.67 The Soviets were determined to capture four
major cities — Changchun, Mukden (Shenyang), Jilin, and Harbin — as quickly as possible,
and sent special mobile units ahead of regular forces. Stalin was especially anxious to
capture  the  strategic  ports  of  Dairen  and  Port  Arthur,  and  ordered  Malinovskii  to
complete their occupation by August 22-23.68
59 On August 10, Vasilevskii ordered Purkaev, commander of the Second Far Eastern Front,
to deploy the 56th Rifle Corps in cooperation with the Pacific Fleet to invade southern
Sakhakin and capture the island by August 22.69 The Soviet units succeeded in seizing
Maoka on August 19 in a confused battle, but the main objective was to capture Otomari.
The landing units encountered a violent storm on the way from Maoka to Otomari, and it
was not until August 26, four days later than Vasilevskii’s plan, that the Soviet troops
captured the port. Since southern Sakhalin was a part of the territory to be given to the
Soviets in the Yalta Secret Agreement, the United States did not raise any objections.
Japan’s Imperial General Headquarters ordered the Japanese forces in Sakhalin to obey
the ceasefire after the emperor’s acceptance of surrender. If capturing southern Sakhalin
was the main purpose,  there was  no reason for  Soviet  haste.  The major  goal  of  the
Sakhalin  landing,  however,  was  to  use  Southern  Sakhalin,  only  40  kilometers  from
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Hokkaido at  the closest  point,  as  a  springboard from which to launch the Kuril  and
Hokkaido operations.
60 Although the Yalta secret agreement stipulated that the Kurils be handed over to the
Soviets, the geographic limits of this volcanic archipelago stretching from Kamchatka to
Hokkaido had not been precisely defined. When the military leaders discussed the zones
of  military  operations  at  the  Potsdam  Conference,  the  entire  Kurils,  except  for  the
northernmost four islands, were given to the American zone. The Americans, however,
did not realize that the Soviets had also acquired the right to capture the Kurils since the
Sea of Okhotsk was recognized as a Soviet operation zone.70
61 The emperor’s acceptance of surrender on August 14 prompted Stalin to initiate the Kuril
operation. On the morning of August 15 (still August 14 in Moscow), clearly in response to
Stalin’s order, Vasilevskii ordered Purkaev and Admiral I.S. Iumashev, commander of the
Pacific  Fleet,  to  occupy  the  northern  parts  of  the  Kurils  without  expecting  any
reinforcement  from other  fronts.  Purkaev  in  turn  told  Major  General  A.R.  Gnechko,
commander of the Kamchatka Defense District: “Japan’s capitulation is expected. Taking
advantage of  this  favorable situation,  seize Shimushu,  Paramushiru,  and Onekotan.”71
Gnechko  had  to  come  up  with  detailed  operational  plans,  organize  landing  ships,
commandeer fishing trawlers, and other logistical tasks in only two days. Inevitably many
mistakes were made, and they led to disastrous results during the attack on Shimushu.72
62 An interesting aspect of this order was that the islands to be seized included not only
Shimushu and Paramushiru, but also Onekotan, which belonged to the American zone of
operation.  Without  knowing  how  the  United  States  would  react  to  the  Soviet  Kuril
operation, Stalin had to be cautious. By including Onekotan, he would be able to test the
American reaction. If he met with opposition from the Americans, he would retreat. If
not, he would expand operations in the central and southern Kurils.
63 The Kuril operations almost ended up in a fiasco. The battle of Shimushu was waged for
four days from August 18 to August 21, although Gnechko was ordered to capture the
island by the end of August 18. The lack of preparations, absence of a well-planned and
well-coordinated strategy, shortage of ships, equipment, artillery, and weapons, and the
numerical inferiority of his soldiers made it impossible for Gnechko’s forces to complete
the mission to occupy the island by the end of the day on August 18, as ordered. If the
Soviets won despite all these weaknesses, it was because the Japanese Imperial General
Headquarters,  horrified by the specter of victory, in no uncertain terms, ordered the
defending Japanese division to surrender.73
64 Meanwhile,  Stalin also engaged in diplomatic maneuvers.  On August 15 Truman sent
General Order Number 1 to Stalin through Harriman. This order designated the Allied
forces to which Japanese armed forces should surrender. On the next day, Stalin sent his
reply through Harriman as well as Gromyko in Washington. He “principally” accepted the
contents of General Order No. 1 with two revisions. The first was “to include in the region
of surrender of Japanese armed forces to Soviet troops all the Kuril Islands [italics mine].”
The second was to include the northern part of Hokkaido above the demarcation line
running from Kushiro to Rumoi in a Soviet occupation zone.74
65 Stalin revealed his intentions even more clearly in his August 17 directive to General Kuz
´ma Derevianko, who was appointed Soviet military representative to General Douglas
MacArthur’s  Allied  headquarters  in  Manila.  Stalin  instructed  Derevianko  to  present
Soviet demands to include the Kurils and the northern part of Hokkaido in the Soviet
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occupation  zone.  In  addition,  Derevianko  was  to  demand  the  creation  of  a  Soviet
occupation zone for stationing Soviet troops in Tokyo.75
66 On August 18, Truman sent a reply to Stalin’s August 16 letter. He agreed “to modify
General Order No. 1 to include all the Kurile Islands” in the Soviet occupation zone. While
conceding this point, however, Truman requested that the United States be granted “air
base rights for land and sea aircraft” on one of the islands, preferably in the central group
“for  military  purposes  and  for  commercial  use.”  Truman drew a  clear  line  between
Hokkaido and the Kurils. Hokkaido was a part of Japan proper, and he was not going to let
Stalin have it. Nevertheless, Truman and his advisers seem to have been concerned that
not conceding “all the Kurils” might lead to Stalin’s  negating the entire Yalta secret
agreement.76
67 Stalin’s proposal to include northern Hokkaido in the Soviet occupation zone was not a
diplomatic ploy. He was dead serious about capturing Hokkaido. It should be recalled that
he had remained non-committal regarding Hokkaido, when the Politburo debated this
issue on June 26-27. Shortly before he wrote his August 16 letter to Truman, he ordered
Vasilevskii  to  implement  the  Hokkaido  and  southern  Kuril  operation.  On  August  18
Vasilevskii, in turn, ordered the commander of the First Far Eastern Front “to occupy the
northern half of Hokkaido from Kushiro to Rumoi and the southern part of the Kuril
Islands” by September 1. For this operation three divisions of the 87th Rifle Corps would
be deployed: two divisions for the Hokkaido operation, and one division for the southern
Kuril operation.77
68 On August 20, however, after Stalin received Truman’s August 18 telegram, Antonov sent
Vasilevskii an order, telling him to instruct the commander of the First Far Eastern Front
to  prepare  the  operation  for  Hokkaido  and  the  southern  Kurils,  but  to  initiate  this
operation only by special order of the Stavka and “prepare for an operation either for
Hokkaido or for the southern Kuril islands.”78
69 On August 21, Vasilevskii issued two directives to begin “immediately and no later than
August 21” the embarkation of the 87th Rifle Corps from the Sakhalin ports of Maoka,
Otomari,  and  Toyohira  for  the  capture  of  Hokkaido  and  the  southern  Kurils.  The
commanders of the First and Second Far Eastern Fronts, the Pacific Fleet, and the air
force were ordered to be ready for airborne operations over Rumoi and to make the air
base available by August  23 for the occupation of  the northern part  of  Hokkaido.  In
addition,  Iumashev  was  to  send  two  marine  divisions  in  two  or  three  echelons  to
Hokkaido. Finally, Vasilevskii reminded all commanders that he would personally give
the order to begin the landing operations for Hokkaido, and that preparations for this
operation should be completed by August 23.79 The Soviet war machine was about to claw
its way on to Hokkaido.
70 But by August 22 something had happened to change Stalin’s mind. On August 22 Stalin
sent a letter in response to Truman’s August 18 letter. He accused Truman of demanding
airbase rights on the Kurils, which he claimed as the inherent Soviet territory. The Yalta
secret  agreement  contained no such provisions,  and “demands  of  such a  nature  are
usually laid before either a conquered state, or such an allied state which is in no position
to defend with its means certain parts of its territory.” In contrast to Stalin’s conciliatory
August 16 letter, this letter was striking in its angry tone. Was Stalin really angry or was
this anger merely a diplomatic ploy? It was most likely both. He was not at all grateful for
Truman’s concessions on the Kurils, which he thought rightfully belonged to the Soviet
Union,  and he was offended by Truman’s rejection of his proposal  to have a slice of
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Hokkaido.80 But why did it take Stalin four full days to answer Truman’s message? This
delay might be related to the progress of military preparations, Soviet intelligence with
regard to the American determination to protect Hokkaido, or to the advice of those who
argued — Molotov, for instance — that the occupation of Hokkaido might jeopardize the
Yalta terms. Stalin had not yet cancelled the Hokkaido operation, but he was retreating
from it.
71 But this retreat meant that the Kurils now assumed center stage. It also sealed the fate of
640,000 Japanese prisoners of war captured by the Soviet forces. Since Stalin had counted
on some portion of the population of Hokkaido to work in the Gulags of the Soviet Far
East, he needed the POW labor force to make good his loss. The Soviet State Defense
Committee (GKO) adopted the notorious resolution GKO 9898 to dragoon the Japanese
POWs for hard labor.81 Approximately, ten percent would die in captivity.
72 The US policymakers discussed how to respond to Stalin’s angry letter. Byrnes was in no
mood to challenge Stalin over the Kurils. Navy Assistant Chief Charles Cooke, and Army
Assistant Chief John Hull had two telephone conversations on August 23, and agreed that
neither  the  Kurils  nor  the  American airbase  rights  there  were  important  enough to
sacrifice the lives of American soldiers.82 The Kuril case was closed. The United States
would not lift a finger when the Soviets seized the islands.
73 Truman was not happy with Stalin’s angry August 22 message. He wrote a reply on August
25, but the message was not delivered to Stalin until August 27. We do not know why he
wasted five days in responding to Stalin’s letter. What we do know is that these five days
were  crucial  for  the  Soviet  southern Kuril  operation.  In  his  letter  to  Stalin  Truman
explained about his request for the landing rights on the Kurils, emphasizing that the
Kurils were not Soviet territory, but Japanese territory, “disposition of which must be
made at a peace settlement.”83 Truman’s strongly worded response must have confirmed
Stalin’s suspicion that the United States was backing away from the commitment made at
Yalta, and it must have made him even more determined to seize all the islands before
the official termination of the war.
74 Stalin realized, however, that his August 22 message might have backfired. Now it was
necessary to back off. He sent his reply to Truman on August 30. He regretted that a
“misunderstanding”  had  slipped  into  their  correspondence.  He  agreed  to  grant  the
landing rights to the United States on one of the Kuril islands in emergency cases during
the Allied occupation of Japan, and even grant an airfield for landing commercial planes.
But in return, he expected the United States to provide an American airfield for Soviet
commercial  planes  on  one  of  the  Aleutian  Islands.  Needless  to  say,  there  was  no
commercial airline in the Soviet Union at that time, so this was also a ploy. The timing of
this  response is  also important.  The three days between the two letters brought the
Soviet operations further south in the Kurils.
75 Gnechko’s forces in charge of occupying the northern and central Kurils managed to seize
all the islands in the northern and the central Kurils up to Uruppu, encountering no
resistance from the Japanese forces.84 As for the southern Kuril operation, on August 23,
Vasilevskii ordered Iumashev to dispatch the main divisions of the 87th Rifle Corps from
Sakhalin to Kunashiri and Etorofu, avoiding Hokkaido. By September 1, the Soviet forces
had occupied Etorofu.
76 The next day, on September 2 Japan formally signed the surrender documents on the
battleship  USS  Missouri in  Tokyo  Bay.  But  the  Soviet  forces  had  not  completed  the
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occupation of the rest of the Kurils. Kunashiri was not captured until September 3. From
there  the  Soviets  proceeded  to  occupy  Shikotan  and  the  Habomai  group,  which
historically,  administratively,  and geographically  belonged to Japan, and should have
been  in  the  American  occupation  zone.  The  occupation  of  all  the  Kurils  was  not
completed until September 5, three days after the Pacific War was officially over.
 
Conclusion
77 During World War II, Stalin was not only concerned with the survival of the Soviet Union,
but also with capturing the territories that would guarantee its security from its potential
enemies. At the Yalta Conference, Stalin scored a diplomatic victory by having Roosevelt
and Churchill  offer  him prizes in exchange for Soviet  participation in the war three
months after the capitulation of Germany. But in order to gain these war trophies, he had
to enter the war,  and conclude an agreement with the Chinese confirming the Yalta
conditions.
78 Thus, for Stalin, the major challenge was to prolong the war long enough for the Soviets
to join it. A number of problems confronted him in pursing this policy. First, he had to
justify the violation of the Neutrality Pact with Japan. In April 1945, Molotov renounced
the Pact,  but  made it  clear  that  the Pact  would be  in  force  until  April  1946.  It  was
necessary to “lull the Japanese to sleep,” under the pretense of neutrality, while behind
the cloak of  neutrality,  the  Soviets  rushed troops  and equipment  to  the  Far  East  to
prepare for the war against Japan. The Soviet Union also exploited Japan’s overtures to
the Soviet Union to mediate for peace, first through the Hirota-Malik negotiations, and
later through the proposal to send Prince Konoe to Moscow as the emperor’s special
envoy. Nevertheless, there still remained the major problem of waging war against Japan
in  violation  of  the  Neutrality  Pact.  And  the  negotiations  with  the  Chinese  were
deadlocked.
79 In order to resolve these two issues, Stalin expected Truman’s support at the Potsdam
Conference. By emphasizing that the Soviet pledge to enter the war remained firm, Stalin
attempted to solicit Truman’s help to put pressure on the intransigent Chinese. But most
importantly, Stalin expected, as he had been promised by Hopkins in May that the United
States and Britain would invite the Soviet  Union to sign the joint  ultimatum against
Japan.
80 The first atomic explosion in New Mexico changed the American policy.  Truman and
Byrnes were now convinced that the Americans had acquired a weapon to force Japan’s
surrender before the Soviets entered the war. They encouraged the Chinese to stand firm
to drag on the negotiations, and the American delegation at Potsdam totally excluded the
Soviet Union from the deliberations of the Potsdam Proclamation. Truman’s less than
candid revelation about the atomic bomb piqued Stalin’s suspicion, but the most decisive
turning point for Soviet policy came when the United States announced the Potsdam
Proclamation, without any prior notification to the Soviet delegation.
81 Stalin  was  now  convinced  that  the  United  States  was  determined  to  secure  Japan’s
surrender  before  the  Soviets  entered  the  war.  Nevertheless,  even  Stalin  could  not
convince the Stavka to change the carefully planned military operation against Japan,
which was scheduled to commence on August 11 on all fronts. The US dropping of the
atomic bomb on Hiroshima, however, shocked Stalin. He believed that the game was over.
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But the Japanese request  to seek Soviet  mediation immediately revived his  hope.  He
changed the date of the attack by forty-eight hours to August 9, and had Molotov read the
declaration of war one hour before the Soviet attack. Stalin succeeded in joining the war
in the nick of time.
82 Japan’s delay in accepting the Potsdam terms unconditionally gave the Soviets time to
advance deep into Manchuria. The emperor’s acceptance of unconditional surrender on
August 14 triggered more intensive Soviet military operations. The Stavka sent airborne
units to capture key Manchurian cities, including Port Arthur and Dairen. The Hokkaido-
Kuril operation began hastily. Stalin initially wished to seize not only the Kurils, but also
the northern half of Hokkaido, but Truman intervened firmly to prevent Stalin’s huge
appetite from going beyond the Yalta Agreement. In order to prevent the Soviets from
obtaining a slice of Hokkaido, however, Truman had to sacrifice the Kurils, although he
knew that the islands, or at least some of them, should belong to Japan.
83 Stalin  managed  to  acquire  much  of  what  he  wanted,  although  he  did  not  gain  an
occupation zone either on Hokkaido or in Tokyo. In the process, however, he alienated
the Japanese by seizing what the Japanese believed to be their own legitimate islands by
violating the Neutrality Pact, especially when the Japanese were desperately seeking his
mediation.  Just  as  in  Europe,  Stalin’s  Far  Eastern  acquisitions  made  Soviet  security
precarious in the long run.
84 Stalin’s approach to Japan was motivated by his geostrategic interests, pure and simple,
and  had  little  to  do  with  Marxist-Leninist  ideology.  He  pursued  his  goals  ruthlessly
employing Machiavellian manipulations. But so did Truman. Both were, to borrow the
title of David Holloway’s recent article, “jockeying for position in the postwar world.”
Truman’s use of the atomic bomb was perceived by Stalin as a means to intimidate the
Soviet  Union,  making subsequent Soviet  policies more intransigent rather than more
amenable. The atomic bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not the first salvo of
the Cold War, as the revisionist historians claim, but contributed to the exacerbation of
Soviet-American  relations,  preparing  the  ground  for the  transition  from  the  Grand
Alliance to the Cold War.
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ABSTRACTS
Abstract
This paper argues that Soviet policy during World War II in Europe was from the very beginning
integrally connected with its policy toward the Far East. At the Yalta Conference, Stalin agreed to
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join the war three months after Germany surrendered in return for the war trophies promised by
Franklin D. Roosevelt. In April, the Soviet government notified the Japanese government that it
had no intention to renew the Neutrality Pact, but assured the Japanese that the pact would be in
force  until  it  expired in  April  1946.  Hiding behind the  cloak of  neutrality,  the  Soviet  Union
transported troops and equipment to the Far East in preparation for the war against Japan. In
July,  the Japanese government sought Moscow’s  mediation to terminate the war.  Stalin took
advantage of the Japanese request to prolong the war. Despite his expectations, however, Stalin
was excluded from the Potsdam Declaration at the Potsdam Conference. The race began between
Harry S. Truman, who wanted to force Japan to surrender with the atomic bomb, and Stalin, who
intended to enter the war before Japan’s surrender.
Résumé
La politique soviétique menée en Europe pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale a toujours été en
étroite  corrélation avec  celle  pratiquée  envers  l’Extrême-Orient.  C’est ce  que l’article  tend à
démontrer. À la Conférence de Yalta, Stalin accepta d’entrer en guerre contre le Japon trois mois
après la  capitulation de l’Allemagne en échange des trophées de guerre promis par Franklin
Roosevelt.  En  avril  1945,  le  gouvernement  soviétique  informa  son  homologue  japonais  qu’il
n’avait pas l’intention de renouveler le Pacte de neutralité mais l’assura que le pacte resterait en
vigueur jusqu’à son terme, soit en avril 1946. Se drapant dans le manteau de la neutralité, l’Union
soviétique fit déplacer en Extrême-Orient des troupes et des équipements afin de préparer la
guerre contre le Japon. En juillet, le gouvernement japonais rechercha la médiation de Moscou
pour mettre un terme à la guerre. Stalin tira avantage de la requête des Japonais pour atermoyer.
Cependant,  contrairement  à  ses  attentes,  Stalin  fut  exclu  de  la  Déclaration  de  Potsdam à  la
Conférence du même nom. La course s’engagea alors entre Harry Truman, qui menaçait le Japon
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